an explicit order of play for at least some participants

Question 1

In a game, a dominated strategy is one where:

It is always the best strategy

It is always the worst strategy

It is the strategy that is the best among the group of worst possible strategies.

Is sometimes the best and sometimes the worst strategy

Question 2

To trust a potential cooperator until the first defection and then never cooperate thereafter is

a dominant strategy

an irrational strategy

a grim trigger strategy

a non-cooperative finite game strategy

a subgame imperfect strategy

Question 3

A key to analyzing subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in sequential games is

predictable behavior

an explicit order of play for at least some participants

information sets that are known with certainty

credible threats clearly communicated

randomness

Question 4

When there is no Equilibrium (or no Nash Equilibrium), we expect that:

Question 1

In a game, a dominated strategy is one where:

It is always the best strategy

It is always the worst strategy

It is the strategy that is the best among the group of worst possible strategies.

Is sometimes the best and sometimes the worst strategy

Question 2

To trust a potential cooperator until the first defection and then never cooperate thereafter is

a dominant strategy

an irrational strategy

a grim trigger strategy

a non-cooperative finite game strategy

a subgame imperfect strategy

Question 3

A key to analyzing subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in sequential games is

predictable behavior

an explicit order of play for at least some participants

information sets that are known with certainty

credible threats clearly communicated

randomness

Question 4

When there is no Equilibrium (or no Nash Equilibrium), we expect that: